To things themselves. Martin Heidegger’s contribution to the meta-theory of the I-subject
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the author claims that during psychoanalysis the psychoanalyst implicitly seeks (using implicit theories) the patient’s being and this would be auspicious but, according to Heidegger’s thought, he also considers it difficult or perhaps impossible due to an oblivion of the being as a result of the traditional metaphysics based on Cartesian thought. Hence, he exposes, in a brief explanation, a part of the philosopher’s thought and suggests bringing the Heideggerian ontology into the psychoanalysis room. through the opening of his being man ‘exists’ and existence indicates only the ex-sistere of human life, his ‘ekstatic’ character in the sense of his ‘being outside himself’ and being exposed to ‘possibilities’, to his ‘not yet being’, which needs to be ‘planned’ and decided. the Author proposes a parallelism with some concepts of Michele Minolli’s meta-theory of the I-subject and also mentions a reinterpretation of the concept of investment understood as signification and expression of being; lastly, he questions whether in the analytic process the couple, patient and analyst, can get in contact with each other’s ‘being’ or whether this is just pure utopia.
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